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Statements
Informal Meeting on the 2010 Review of the Peacebuilding CommissionAmbassador Gert Rosenthal
May 10th, 2010
General Assembly • 64th Session • International peace and security
Distinguished Co-facilitators,
You have asked us to limit our remarks to the institutional aspects of the Peace Building Commission; that is, its impact on the institutional architecture of the United Nations.
In this regard, with the benefit of ten years of experience, we note that the Peace Building Commission has intersected with three sensitive topics that appear at the center of our debates on reform. I am referring, in the first place, to the relationship between the three main intergovernmental organs of the Organization; second, to the relationship between the intergovernmental organs and the Secretariat, and, third, to the relationship between the Secretariat, UNDP and international financial institutions. I would like to briefly mention our concerns about each of these issues.
First, it is no secret that there has been a secular tension between the three main intergovernmental organs, particularly the General Assembly, on the one hand, and the Security Council, on the other, regarding the limits of their respective jurisdictions. The same can be said on the relation between the General Assembly, especially the Second Committee, and the Economic and Social Council. The Charter makes clear that the Security Council's role is limited to maintaining peace and ending conflicts, but it must be recognized that there is an overlap between the peace keeping and the consolidation of peace. The creation of the Peace Building Commission, conceived as an advisory body to the three bodies that nominate, in more-or- less equal parts, the membership of the Organizational Committee, was conceived, at least implicitly, as a formula to facilitate smoother relations between the three organs. However, experience suggests two outcomes that are not wholly compatible with this objetive: first, the role of ECOSOC appears diminished in relation to that of the other two organs; and, second, it could be argued that instead of limiting the Security Council strictly to its role of maintaining the peace, the new forum offers said Council a path for expanding its sphere of activities into peace building. This is another manner of saying that in our review exercise, it would be very convenient to clarify how the appearance of this new intergovernmental body, subsidiary to the three main intergovernmental organs established by the Charter, would help to define, or at least offer the potential of helping to define, the distribution of responsibilities of each in the field of peace building. This is another way of saying that the role of the Commission should contribute to making peace building a cooperative effort between the three organs, rather than a competitive undertaking.
Second, we have the impression that the traditional formula of interaction between the Secretariat and intergovernmental forums, whereby the Secretariat proposes and implements, but the Governments decide and ask for accountability, has been altered somewhat in the case of the Peace Building Commission. On the one hand, despite the commendable work done by the Peace Building Support Office, it does not have the resources to fulfill its important role. We also have the impression that the coordination between the Support Office and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is susceptible to improvement. On the other hand, the Commission, and especially the Country-Specific configuration, has Permanent Representatives assuming a protagonist role that tends to go beyond the usual practice, with regular field trips and tasks that border on executive functions, instead of the traditional role of formulating policies and offering guidance to the Secretariat. This is another area which will undoubtedly require attention in our review process. At least one irrefutable conclusion refers to the need to strengthen the Support Office.
Lastly, it is no secret that in the past there was some tension between the Secretariat and especially the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme around the functions that correspond to each in post-conflict peace building. The fact that the Peace Building Fund is administered by UNDP suggests that at least in this regard there is an improved outlook for better coordination. However, this matter would have to be further verified, and, where appropriate, further steps should be taken to ensure a coordinated effort between the Peace Building Commission, the Fund and UNDP. Another area susceptible to improvements is in the area of coordination between the Peace Building Commission and the International Financial Institutions (global and regional) as well as with regional bodies.
One final point, distinguished co-facilitators which is also related to the institutional architecture of the United Nations. We have assembled a relatively large apparatus to address what has hitherto been a very limited number of countries emerging from conflict. With the exception of one of the facilities of the UN Peace building Fund , which has been open to a wider number of countries, we must examine and upscale the Commission in order to avoid the dilemma of choosing some countries for priority attention and neglect others who may have the same level of justification.
Thank you.
